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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I will argue that the economic system that evolved by late 1920s in the former 
Soviet Union was based on a narrow interpretation of Marx's theory of historical development, as 
well as the state of the world economy in 1920s and early 1930s. Thus, between the two extremes 
of the interpretations of Soviet experience, i.e. the ` death of Marx', the end of history (Fukuyama 
1992) on the one hand and the complete exoneration of Marx (Callinicos 1991) on the other 
hand, I will follow a middle course closer to the latter but not identical to it. I will particularly 
isolate those elements of Marx's thought that led to interpretations that was at the core of the 
Soviet economic system. 
In what follows I will first look at the essence of Marx's vision of communism. I will then 
consider the views of Engels and the economists of the Second International. This will be 
followed by a brief review of the Soviet economic development and the industrialization debate 
in the 1920s. Finally I will evaluate the Soviet economic thought and policy in this period that led 
to the creation of the Soviet economic system in late 1920s.     
 
MARX'S VISION OF COMMUNISM 
According to Marx capitalism expands free time by expanding the pool of suplus labour (surplus 
value). This surplus value is appropriated by capitalists. Although in its absolute form surplus 
value expands, its further expansion runs into limits that are physiological (strength and health of 
 3 
the working population), political (the rise of trade union movement, etc.) and physical (the 
working day cannot be pushed beyond a maximum number of hours in a day) (see Shamsavari 
1991, Chap. Six). This is why the industrial revolution was such a significant stage in the 
development of capitalism. With the use of machinery surplus value can expand (without the 
prolongation of or even with reduction in the working day) in two ways: a) a reduction in the 
necessary labour time by cheapening the cost of wage goods and b) intensification of the labour 
process by use of advanced machinery (eg. assembly line) or by managerial techniques (e.g. 
Taylorism, unknown to Marx). Thus the key for Marx was technology. Technology held the key 
to the gates of a workers' paradise in which the free time appropriated by capitalists would be at 
workers disposal-free time for their development as human beings. For Marx this represents the 
essence of communism and the beginning of history, i.e. the true history of human development, 
rather than economic development. The following lines from Grundrisse clearly shows the 
primacy of human development for Marx, which puts him still way beyond current concerns with 
this issue: 
Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the aim of production, regardless 
of his limited national, religious, political character, seems to be very lofty when 
contrasted to the modern world, where production appears as the aim of mankind and 
wealth as the aim of production. In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is 
stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of the individual needs, 
capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc. created through universal exchange? The full 
development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well 
as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative  potentialities, 
with no pre-supposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this 
totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in 
 4 
itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? (Marx 1973, p.488) 
This vision is highly commendable and should be at the core of every socialist movement worthy 
of the name. However the process of achieving this lofty goal has proven to be much more 
complicated than Marx's view of it as a workers-led revolution that overthrows the capitalist rule 
and its mode of production. I will return to this question at the conclusion of this study. The point 
to emphasise again is that for Marx technological change, the growth of productive forces under 
capitalism, is the absolute foundation for communist mode of production. This view formed the 
core of the  thought of socialist economists of the Second International as well as the architects of 
the Soviet economic system.    
Viewed in this light it would seem that I have interpreted Marx's theory of historical development 
in the narrowest possible way, not just as an economic determinism but worse as a technological 
determinism. I have strongly criticized these interpretations elsewhere, in particular in connection 
with Cohen's interpretation (see Shamsavari 1991, Introduction). I have also demonstrated that 
Marx's writings on the history of capitalism in the West leaves no doubt that he was not an 
economic determinist. His analysis of capitalist development shows clearly that capitalist 
relations of production and capitalist superstructure was already in place before the industrial 
revolution in England. He believed that industrial revolution created the suitable technology for 
capitalist mode of production (Shamsavari 1997a). From this one could conclude that socialist 
society would also develop an appropriate technological basis suitable to its requirements. I 
believe that this conclusion is valid. The technological revolutions under capitalism have 
shortened the labour time but they have not contributed significantly to the increase in free time 
available for human development. Even the invention of time-saving household consumer 
durables has plunged workers and their families deeper into work (an increase in absolute surplus 
value as women and children join the working force). As I will show later the technologies 
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developed under capitalism are only suitable for capitalist development. The point I wish to 
emphasize at this juncture is that although Marx did not think technology is neutral to mode of 
production in which it develops, a narrow interpretation of his broad and general formulation in 
his Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy [1867] (Marx 1970) could 
easily lead to an opposite interpretation. It is important to recognize that what Marx mostly 
admired capitalism for was the creation of a world market and increase in the productivity of 
labour. These capitalism has achieved almost perfectly but not to the advantage of human 
development but further capitalist development. It is unfortunate that Engels and the economists 
of the Second International confused the socialization of labour and production under capitalism 
with socialism. 
    
ENGELS ON SOCIALIZATION OF PRODUCTION 
Engels's view of the socialization of production under capitalism had a profound influence on the 
economists of the Second International and shaped their views on the nature of capitalism and 
transition to socialism. According to Engels the advance of capitalist development progressively 
involves a displacement of `individual production' and the rise of `social production'. This 
`socialization' of production, however, is in conflict with capitalist private appropriation (Engels 
1976, pp. 348-49). He also speaks of the `contradiction between social organization in the 
individual factory and social anarchy in production as a whole' (ibid. p. 368). By social anarchy 
of production he means `unbridled competitive struggle', i.e. anarchy of the market. Engels 
proposes a series of such contradictions characterizing capitalism, which all boil down to the fact 
that while capitalism progressively `socializes' production it keeps means of production 
concentrated in the hands of capitalists. Could one perhaps conjecture that he is implying a 
contradiction between forces of production and relations of production? To a large extent this is 
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true as he refers to the social nature of means of production and cooperative nature of factory 
work on the one hand and the private appropriation of the results of production on the other hand. 
But his analysis is not always consistent as he refers to the `partial recognition of the social 
character of the productive forces imposed on capitalists themselves', as evident from 
development of joint-stock companies, trusts and the state ownership. (Ibid. p. 369). 
Thus not only productive forces are progressively socialized, the forms of ownership increasingly 
take more `social' forms as opposed to individual or family ownership. Thus the contradiction 
between productive forces and production relations are pushed to a limit leading to rigid and 
abstract opposition resulting in an apparent resolution of the contradiction. 
If we are to believe Engels, all the major ingredients of socialism were in existence in late 1870s. 
I think Engels's analysis is based on a confusion between the capitalist form of socialization and 
socialization of production in general. This confusion is in a way quite understandable as 
capitalism historically represents the most socialized mode of production. However, according to 
Marx, all historical modes of production are social forms of production. The nature and extent of 
socialization changes from one mode to another. But the social nature of production is the most 
fundamental feature of human historical development. In Engels the opposition between 
`individual' and `social' production is so rigidly maintained that capitalism becomes identified 
with social and pre-capitalist forms with individual production.  
 
THE ECONOMSTS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL 
The economists of the Second International were on the one hand heavily influenced by the 
mechanistic interpretations of Marx's view of history (reinforced by Engels's work) and Marx's 
vision of the capitalist development. The role of economic (and particularly technological) 
development as the prime mover of historical change (in short the primacy of the productive 
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forces in shaping not only social relations of production but also the superstructure) led these 
economists to believe that the productive forces under capitalist mode of production had matured 
enough to be in contradiction with the social form of production. This was expressed, folowing 
Engels, in the dictom that under capitalism forces of production had already achieved a high 
degree of socialization while the ownership of means of production remained in private hands. 
This made the ideal of achieving socialism very easy. Following the owerthrow of capitalist 
system of ownership all that had to be done was to make the already developed forces of 
production serve the purpose of socialism. 
While one can make a strong case for the influence of the nature of capitalist development in late 
19th and early 20th century on the writings of the economists of the Second International 
(including Engels) an equally strong case may be made in the opposite direction, i.e. that the very 
conception of the nature of the capitalist mode of production, especially compared with other 
modes of production, among these economists lied at the root of their response to the 
developmental tendencies of capitalism at a certain stage of capitalist development. The main 
foundation upon which this conception rested was the rigid and total conceptual  opposition of 
the capitalist mode with pre- and post-capitalist modes of production. In this conception while the 
capitalist economy is totally ruled by the ` anarchy' of markets, where human will, plan or desire 
play no direct role, the non-capitalist modes are ruled by some kind of central direction in which 
human will and purpose (individual or collective) plays a more direct part. In the work of these 
economists the fundamental opposition between capitalist and non-capitalist economies were 
often expressed in two closely related ideas or `images': 
a)  The `opacity' of the capitalist economy compared to the `transparency' of non-capitalist 
economies. 
b) The irrelevance of the `science' of political economy for the pre-capitalist economies and its 
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disappearance under socialism. 
The following quotations represents a small sample. 
In her pamphlet `What is Economics', Rosa Luxemburg compares the capitalist economy first 
with a self-sufficient peasant economy and then with the household of Charlemagne. In both 
cases she reaches identical conclusions. In the first case production is directly oriented towards 
the needs of the community, the work is organised consciously based on the available resources 
and quantity of  `wealth' directly depends on the quantities of these resources.   
As a matter of fact, all the relations in such a peasant economy are so open and 
transparent that their dissection by the scalpel of Economics appear indeed idle play. 
(Luxemburg, n.d. p. 63, our italics) 
In the case of the household of Charlemagne also the purpose or production is the satisfaction of 
human needs; there is division of labour but no commodities are produced and that the quantity 
of wealth depends on the quantity of factors of production.   
Thus in all probability, we should not be able to think up any kind of mysterious 
problems for the science of Economics to analyse and solve there, in as much as all 
relations, cause and effect, labour and instrument are crystal-clear (ibid. p.66, our italics) 
 What is striking in both examples is the fact that the needs of human existence directly 
guide and determine the work, and that the results correspond exactly to the intentions 
and the needs, and that, regardless of the scale of production, economic relations manifest 
an astonishing simplicity and transparency. (ibid. pp. 67-68. our italics) 
This transparency, simplicity, makes pre-capitalist economies accessible to the knowing subject 
without a need for `science'. The latter is required only when the nature of the economy 
envelopes it into mysteries and riddles that need uncovering and solving. Such is the case with 
capitalism. The anarchy of markets transforms the results of human will, purpose and activity 
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into riddles and mysteries.  
And it is precisely this anarchy which is responsible for the fact that the  economy  of 
human society produces results which are mysterious and unpredictable to the people 
involved... . Scientific analysis must discover ex post facto that purposefulness and  those 
rules governing human economic life which conscious planfulness did not impose on it 
beforehand. (ibid. p. 80)   
She then predicts that Economics will disappear with the demise of capitalism:  
If Economics is a science dealing with the particular laws of the capitalist mode 
of production, then its reason for existence and its function are bound to the life 
span of the latter and Economics will lose its base as soon as that mode of 
production will have ceased to exist. (ibid. p.90) 
We find the same trend of thought in Bukharin:  
Only unorganised social economy presents such specific phenomena in which the mutual 
adaptation of the various parts of the production organism proceeds independently of the 
human will consciously turned to that end. In a planful guidance of the social economy, 
the distribution and redistribution  of the social production forces constitutes a conscious 
process based on statistical data. In the present anarchy of production, this process takes 
place through a transfer mechanism of prices... . All these are characteristics of modern 
society and constitute the subject of political economy. In a socialist society, political 
economy will lose its raison d' etre: there will remain only an "economic geography"-- a 
science of the idiographic type; and an "economic politics"-- a normative science; for the 
relations between men will be simple and clear... .(Bukharin, 1969, p.49, our italics) 
Preobrazhensky argues along very similar lines. For him  
'Political Economy is the science which reveals the law of development and equilibrium 
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and (in part) the laws of decay of the commodity and commodity-capitalist mode of 
production, as a planless, unorganised mode of production. As opposed to capitalism 
socialist economy appears as planned economy in which the commodity of the capitalist 
mode of production is replaced ... by the product, value by the measurement of labour 
time, the market ... by the book-keeping of planned economy, surplus value by surplus 
product, so in the sphere of science political economy gives place to social technology, 
that is, the science of socially organised production.’ (Preobrazhensky, 1965, p. 48) 
No doubt all of these writers were strongly influenced by Marx's theory of ` commodity fetishism' 
as expounded in Chapter One of Capital I. However as we will see shortly this reliance on Marx 
was very one-sided and ignored other elements in Marx's theory of capitalist development. At this 
point we wish to emphasise that once the  opposition between capitalist and non-capitalist 
economies is formulated in terms of a polar opposition between the `anarchy' of markets and 
planned/organized production and furthermore this opposition is rigidly maintained then any sign 
of increase in  planned or central direction or any diminution in the role of markets (as was 
occurring during the late 19th and early 20th centuries) is bound to be greeted as a negation or 
transcendence of capitalism itself (albeit within the capitalist shell, whatever that may mean). In 
fact the early `revisionism' of Eduard Bernstein as well as the later theories of his ardent 
opponent Karl Kautsky (e.g. superimperialism to which Lenin strongly opposed) can be attributed 
to this conception of the capitalist system. 
Let us now see if in fact this conception finds any support in Marx apart from his theory of 
fetishism. 
As opposed to Adam Smith who advanced a single concept of division of labour embracing both 
the division of labour in the workshop and that in society at large (thus conceiving society as 
being similar to a `giant factory') and for whom the difference between the two was a matter of 
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degree and scale Marx makes a qualitative distinction between the two. His criterion for this 
distinction was the absence or presence of commodity exchange. Thus the difference between the 
two divisions consists in that under capitalism social division of labour is mediated by 
commodities while the technical division of labour within the factory is not so mediated (Marx 
1976, pp.474-475). This sharp distinction, however does not prevent Marx from recognising a 
dynamic relationship between the two:  
Since the production and the circulation of commodities are the general prerequisites of 
the capitalist mode of production, division of labour in manufacture requires that a 
division of labour within society should have already attained a certain degree of 
development. Inversely, the division of labour in manufacture reacts back upon that in 
society, developing and multiplying it further. (Ibid. p.473) 
Marx, in fact, goes beyond this perspective and characterises the division of labour within the 
workshop as ` an entirely specific creation of the capitalist mode of production' (ibid. p.480). Thus 
the factory, which is a sphere of `direct' organisation and allocation of labour as opposed to the 
market place, far from being  an 'island'  in the great ocean of anarchy of market, is at the very 
centre of the social division of labour under capitalism (see Shamsavari, 1983, Chap.8). To 
present the capitalist mode of production as a system ruled completely by the anarchy of markets, 
thus, amounts to a misrepresentation of Marx's view of capitalism.  
What was happening in the late 19th and early 20th centuries involved an increase in scale of 
production (e,g. via vertical integration). This implied the triumph of planning over the anarchy 
of market for these economists. Associated with the ideas expounded so far was also the notion 
that the enlargement of the scale of production (by 'bringing the workers together') implied 
greater socialization of labour and therefore heralded the birth of socialism as a completely 
socialized system of production. To identify the degree of the  socialization of labour with the 
 12 
scale of production is justified only in a limited way. One may, on the other hand, conceive of  
the scale of production as a reaction to lower degrees of the socialization of labour. Let us be 
more specific. Marx analyses the early phases of capitalist development in Britain  as an 
evolution from the `putting-out' system through handicraftsmen brought under one roof, the 
manufactory, leading up to the large-scale machine industry. Surely the necessity of bringing the 
handicraftsmen `under one roof', which according to Marx, achieved increased productivity 
without a change in technology was result of the high costs of transportation and communication 
in general. Let us not forget that the premises of capitalist production are the scatered nature of 
labourers and their instruments of production. At this stage socialization of labour assumes the 
form of aggregation precisely because the starting point is fragmentation of labour and means of 
production which is costly due to the lack of the development of the infrastructure. Today, 
developing countries also exhibit a large degree of concentration of industry, technologically as 
well as geographically-- a fact much criticised by development economists as involving `urban 
bias', capital-intensive technology, dualism and uneven income distribution. Thus in this case one 
can clearly see that large-scale production is not necessarily a sign of super-development but 
under-development. Similarly the early industrialisation drive in both Germany and Russia in the 
19th century assumed highly concentrated forms of production, i.e. through the role of the state 
and in the case of Germany large investment banks (the 'Trotsky-Greshenkron effect').  
Marx does indeed characterize capitalist production as large-scale, as cooperative and as 
socialized. This has to do with nature of capitalism as a system based on an unbound search for 
surplus-value. But to base any conclusions about the precise nature of the technical scale of 
capitalist units of production upon this observation is to confuse the social relations of a system 
with its technical basis. To identify any particular form that capitalist socialization of labour 
assumes in different stages of capitalist development with the specific essence of socialisation 
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under capitalism is bound to lead to the wrong conclusions about the nature of capitalist 
development. 
Cooperation remains the fundamental form of capitalist mode of production, although in 
its simple shape it continues to appear as one particular form alongside the more 
developed ones. (Marx, ibid, p 454) 
Here Marx is clearly distinguishing between co-operation as a fundamental basis of capitalism 
and the `simple shape of co-operation' that may characterise an early phase of the capitalist 
development or function alongside more developed forms of co-operation. (see Shamsavari, 
1991, Chap. Seven)            
 
FROM THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION TO THE SPRING OF 1921 
In this period the SU economy was characterized by `war communism', which involved direct 
role of the state not only in production but also distribution of goods. In more detail, it involved i) 
the policy of forcible requisition of agricultural surpluses by government; ii) nationalization of 
numerous industrial sectors; iii) abolition of private trade; iv) forced mobilization of workers and 
v) application of class and social principles to the distribution of income (Gregory & Stuart 
1986). These policies replaced the market link between the urban and rural areas by 
administrative devices. 
This period coincided with foreign intervention and civil war. The state of war more or less 
dictated/necessitated state intervention in the economy. This was not quite unique to SU. For 
instance, during the 2nd WW Britain went through a period of massive state intervention in 
production and distribution of civilian goods (eg. rationing of consumer goods). 
But what was unique in the SU situation was that for some theoreticians war communism was the 
model of a socialist economy a la Marx, eg. total socialization of the economy accompanied by 
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the demise of money, markets and exchange--triumph of planning over anarchy of market. These 
included Preobrazhenski and Bukharin who had formulated the system of communism along 
these lines (Bukharin & Preobrazhenski 1969). As we have seen above there was a well-
established body of literature from the economists of the Second International, which lent support 
to this line of thinking.    
What was also unique in SU experience was the way in which various groups of party 
intellectuals interpreted the end of war communism. While for some the onset of NEP 
represented a temporary relaxation of the discipline of war communism, for others including 
Lenin, NEP represented the normal state of affairs in post-revolutionary stage in a country which 
was industrially less-developed and in which the agricultural sector was still the predominant 
sector employing the largest percentage of the labour force. Lenin in fact had advocated a policy 
similar to NEP in 1918 . Thus for Lenin war communism was not the appropriate model for post-
revolutionary SU and that war communism was imposed purely by the state of civil war (Ehrlich 
1960, pp. 3-4). Let us not forget that in this period land had been distributed among the mass of 
peasantry. The dominant social form in agriculture was small scale peasant farming. The 
liberated land-holding peasantry wished to improve their standard of living. This required 
favourable terms of trade between agricultural and manufactured goods. 
The economic crisis that led to the adoption of NEP was a result of the fact that farmers could not 
obtain sufficient quantities of manufactured goods in exchange for their grain, a situation due to 
the shift in manufacturing sector from civilian to defence goods. 
 
LENIN AND NEP 
The clarity of Lenin's view of NEP is quite extraordinary. It is a lesson not so much for socialist 
development in a developed country as it is for economic development in a less-developed 
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country. 
Lenin's views were inspired by three circumstances: 
i)  the economic backwardness of the SU 
ii)  The non-occurrence of the expected and much-hoped for German revolution. 
iii)  The failure of war communism in maintaining worker-peasant alliance which was the 
backbone of the success of October Revolution. 
Now I shall elaborate these points.  
I.  In Tax in Kind (Lenin 1975, v.3), in which Lenin announced the NEP, the following 
major points are made: 
i)  the recognition of the multiplicity of modes of production in the SU. 
ii)  the possibility of bringing these together, through electrification (dismissed since this 
required revolution in the West). 
iii)  the advantages of capitalism and state capitalism. 
iv)  the advantages of trade links between industry and agriculture. 
By giving priority to agriculture and links between agriculture and industry, Lenin demonstrated 
great insight in the process of development that anticipates much later debates after WWII on 
strategies of economic development in LDCs. For instance after decades of high growth in some 
of these countries in the 1970s it was clear that these countries were reaching their limits and 
only could continue by running huge foreign debt, while they were lagging behind some other 
countries in terms of indices of human development (income distribution, employment, health 
and education). This led to criticisms of these policies that for one author involved urban bias 
(Lipton 1977) and for others lacked any attention to `basic needs`. On the other hand countries 
that invested heavily in agriculture not only continued  to grow within the tumultuous conditions 
of world economy in the 1970s and 1980s (eg. India and China) but also showed major 
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improvements in meeting basic needs. Pre-Soviet historical experience also shows that 
agricultural development was essential for industrialization. In Britain the commercialization of 
agriculture in 18th century (after the `enclosures') created a prosperous rural community with a 
penchant for manufactured goods. In the USA the land grant schemes created a large population 
of well- to- do farmers that constituted a strong home market for manufactured goods In Japan 
after the Meiji Restoration industrialization went hand in hand with agricultural transformation 
that involved the end of feudal system, improvement of seeds, irrigation and rural infrastructure. 
Thus Lenin not only had a correct policy towards agriculture that anticipated later debates on 
economic development in LDCs but also had a wealth of historical experience to support him 
(whether or not he was aware of this latter point is immaterial).  
II.  Like Marx and Engels before him, Lenin was an internationalist. He conceived capitalism 
as an international system and socialist revolution as global. Thus for him socialism was nothing 
short of an international system of production. His call before WWi was for world revolution 
(ignored by most of the Western social democratic parties). And even after the October 
Revolution he was still hoping for revolution in Germany which was the industrial power house 
of the Western Europe. By 1921 his hopes for such a revolution started to fade. It is clear from 
his writings in this period such as Our Revolution and Better fewer, but better Lenin 1975, v.3) 
that he could not foresee a socialist system for the isolated post-revolutionary SU. But what he 
was hoping for was a programme of reconstruction that would prepare SU for the eventual 
passage to socialism. The doctrine of ` socialism in one country', a fabrication by Stalin to suit his 
own aims, would have been completely alien to Lenin. It is in this light also that NEP should be 
evaluated. 
III.  The policy of War Communism, discussed above, was successful in the limited aims of  
restoring production levels and distribution channels disrupted by the War and Civil War. 
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However with its administrative methods involving direct requisition of foodstuff from farmers 
without providing them material incentives in the form of affordable manufactured goods, it was 
threatening to shake the foundations of the October Revolution, which was based on worker-
peasant alliance. This gives us a further cause to appreciate the importance of NEP that freed 
farmers from all administrative obligations, created a free market for farming output and  
imposed only a moderate, uniform tax in kind. 
 
THE SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION DEBATE   
While NEP worked very well for a while in the sense of removing shortages of agricultural 
output, shortly after Lenin's death in 1924 problems started to re-emerge again. Shortages of 
manufactured goods again started to reflect in shortages of agricultural products. In the heydays 
of NEP as industrial production began to resume pre-war levels when soldiers filled the factories 
as workers, the newly acquired prosperity of the farmers (a consequence of the NEP) demanded 
greater quantity of manufactured goods than was possible to produce with the given capital stock 
in industry. This resulted in the `goods famine' or what we today would call inflation. This 
situation sparked off the Soviet industrialization debate of the mid 1920s in which many eminent 
economists inside and outside the Bolshevik Party participated. This debate highlighted the 
dilemma presented by the NEP: Investment in the long-run would solve the ` goods famine'. In the 
short-run, however, sacrifices had to be made. 
Although many divergent points of view were represented in these debates, two main opposing 
policies emerged, i.e. a continuation of NEP combined with requisite reforms and a programme 
of super-industrialization. Shanin and Bukharin favoured the first, while Trotsky and 
Preobrazhenski advocated the latter. Stalin first sided with Bukharin, but after the removal  of 
Trotsky from power and his subsequent exile, Stalin embraced the super-industrialization policy 
 18 
and went about it with a determination and ruthlessness which is rare in recent history (more on 
this below). 
Bukharin and Shanin favoured an extension of the NEP: a peasant-driven form of indutrialization 
in which goods would be produced cheaper in the industrial sector (thus easing inflation) through 
efficiency improvements in this sector in the short run and agriculture can become a source of 
capital accumulation in the country and thus ease capital shortage problem in the long run. 
Shanin's arguments were based on two premises: 
1.  `Short-term increment in real output to be derived from an additional ruble of investment 
(marginal output-capital ratio) in agriculture exceeded that of industry, especially in view of 
agriculture's surplus population and its low capital intensity.' 
2.  `There was a higher propensity to save in agriculture than in industry.' 
On the other hand, Preobrazhenski advocated a process of `socialist' primitive accumulation, 
which would involve a heavy toll on peasantry in the form of higher taxes and collectivization 
that would generate sufficient surplus to renew, rebuild and add to the existing stock of capital 
goods in the industrial sector.  Higher taxes on peasantry would ease inflation in the short-run 
and collectivization will help to expand industrial capacity at the expense of farmer's standard of 
living and thus eliminating inflation in the long-run. But the aim was not primarily to deal with 
inflation but essentially with massive industrialization and proletarization of the peasantry, which 
were seen as essential ingredients of every socialist economy.  
While, I personally, am not convinced that Bukharin's pro-agricultural policy would have worked 
in solving the problems of Soviet economy in the 1920s and lay the foundations for a future 
socialist system (as envisaged by Lenin), it is clear, from historical perspective, that the 
programme of super-industrialization brought disaster to Soviet economy and lay at the root of its 
eventual collapse in 1989. In what follows I will concentrate on the theoretical weaknesses of this 
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programme.  
Preobrazhensky was very much influence by Marx's reproduction tables in the 2nd volume of the 
Capital as well as his account of the capitalist primitive accumulation. Let us look at these points 
in turn. Marx's reproduction tables are very abstract models of capital accumulation under 
capitalism. These tables largely ignored the role of demand and the sphere of circulation.  Marx's 
account of the primitive accumulation is based on the exploitation of labour (extraction of 
absolute surplus-value) prior to the emergence of industrial capital. 
None of these two points are particularly relevant to socialist development. Nor are they 
necessarily relevant to economic development in a country where the majority of the work force 
is engaged in agriculture. And if we consider the case of SU after the October Revolution they 
become even less relevant as SU did not have any prospects for colonial exploitation. The truth is 
that Marx's account of primitive accumulation was based on the experience of early colonial 
powers that later embarked on industrialization (eg. Britain). The experience of industrialization 
in the USA and Germany in late 19th century show that such primitive accumulation was neither 
necessary nor sufficient for industrialization. In fact in the USA it is after the abolition of slavery 
in the South (a candidate for source of primitive accumulation)  that US industrialization really 
took off. 
Towards the end of 1920s, Stalin who had purged both Trotsky and Preobrazhensky under the 
banner of Bukharin's programme took up the former's mantle and embarked on a massive 
programme of industrialization on the basis of the collectivization of agriculture and huge 
technology borrowings from the West. It is difficult to judge whether Stalin's shift to the left was 
 based on theoretical consideration (which I personally doubt) or was prompted by the urgency of 
Soviet industrialization in face of collapsing Western economies and the threat of war against the 
SU (I tend to favour the latter). But whatever the reasons, the whole process made a mockery of 
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all the theoretical foundations of Marxism and Leninism. 
However, as the focus of this paper is to pursue possible links between Marx's view of socialism 
and the shape of the economic system that emerged in the 1930s in the SU, I shall now 
concentrate on issue of technology transfer and social relations of production in in this period. 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFER AND LABOUR ORGANIZATION IN SU IN 1930S 
Soviet industrialization in the 1930s (and later) relied heavily on technology transfer from 
Western countries on licensing agreement. This point is confirmed by a great variety of sources. 
According to Grossman (1971, p. 33) while the import of capital from the West was `relatively 
minor', the import of capital goods as well as hiring of Western experts was enormous in 1920s 
and 1930s. According to Bergson:  
`In transforming its productive methods under the five year plans, the USSR has been 
able to borrow technology from abroad on an extraordinary scale. Although in early 
stages the USA also obtained technology from abroad, the borrowing hardly could have 
been comparable to the USSR under five year plans'. (Bergson 1963, p. 34) 
According to Powell:  
`Soviet borrowings of Western techniques in the early years of industrialization were 
deliberate, extensive, and certainly consequential'. (Powell 1963, p.174) 
And Kuznets:  
`The foreign trade policy was an example, so characteristic of the economic growth of the 
USSR, of the combination of borrowing production tools and methods from abroad and 
withholding from the consumer the welfare benefits of these tools and methods.' (Kuznets 
1963, p. 367)     
The points made in the sources quoted above can be highlighted in the following way: 
 21 
1.  Import of Western technology in 1920s and 1030s was extensive and enormous. 
2.  Import of capital (finance) was negligible. 
3.  Import of western technical personnel was considerable. 
 
 
4.  Unlike the USA, which also imported a lot of foreign technology in its early phase of 
industrialization, SU continued to be dependent on imported technology beyond the 1930s and  
1940s. 
5.  The imported technology did not improve the welfare of the Soviet consumer (specially 
the working class). 
The above points paint a picture of soviet economy that at once is both (by now) familiar and at 
the same time still obscure. For instance, the abuse of the working class both at factory floor and 
the shopping centre is very well known and well documented (see Filzer 1986). What is not as 
widely known is the extent of Soviet dependence on (legally or illegally) imported technology. 
Thus a major authority on technology transfer refers to the SU alongside Japan as models of 
progress towards technological independence, compared for example with India (Stewart 1978, 
Chap.5). The secret of this policy, Stewart asserts, lies in a number of measures including use of 
licensing agreements instead of FDI, strict control of technology imports and considerable 
modification of imported technology. The evidence, as far as SU is concerned, does not support 
the thesis of technological independence. As we have seen technology continued to be imported 
and the modifications, if any, was not in any way to make it appropriate for socialist 
development. 
The technology transfer from the West was completely consistent with mechanistic interpretation 
of Marx's theory of historical development, as is clearly evident in the writtings of Engels and the 
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economists of the Second International. If we accept, as they believed, that productive forces by 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had reached a very high level of socialization, 
then the import of this `socialized' technology and combining it with `socialist' forms of 
ownership presented no problems. 
 
However, as discussed, in Marx we find a very different view of the relationship between 
technology and social development. In Capital I Marx goes into a lot of detail as to how 
technology developed under capitalism to serve the requirements of capital, eg. total dependence 
of workers on capitalists through  development of machinery and the concomitant de-skilling of 
workers. Thus capitalism develops capitalist technology. 
The failure of SU as a socialist model is based on a confusion of the analysis o capitalist form of 
socialization of production with the advent of socialism. If we generalize Marx`s analysis of 
capitalism in Capital I, it is clear that socialist relations of production will necessitate the 
development of a set of socialized productive forces appropriate to them-  forces which will be 
entirely different from those found under capitalism- and which will reproduce them much in the 
same way that capitalist technology reproduces capitalist relations of production. 
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